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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
THOMAS PARKER
a/k/a Seagull
     Thomas Parker,
                  Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00175-8)
District Judge:  Honorable Malcolm Muir
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 2, 2008
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 9, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Parker pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to distribute
in excess of five grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The District
Court sentenced him to 188 months in prison, to be followed by four years of supervised
release.  Parker appeals his sentence, arguing that it is unreasonable.  For the reasons set
forth below, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
In September 2005, Parker traveled to Pennsylvania and began transporting,
cutting, packaging, and selling crack cocaine.  In total, the Government estimates that
Parker was accountable for purchasing and distributing approximately 250 grams of crack
cocaine between December 2005 and April 2006.  On May 10, 2006, a grand jury
returned an indictment against Parker, charging him with distribution and possession with
intent to distribute in excess of fifty grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1).  Parker pled not guilty to the charge.  In October 2006, the Government filed
an information charging Parker with distributing and possessing with intent to distribute
in excess of five grams of crack cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  In
December 2006, Parker appeared before the District Court and pled guilty to an
3information.  The District Court then granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the
indictment.
The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Report (“PSR”) that
calculated a Guidelines sentence of 188 to 235 months.  The PSR assigned Parker an
overall offense level of thirty-one and established that he had eight prior convictions for
drug related crimes resulting in a criminal history category of VI.  After reviewing the
PSR and hearing arguments from Parker and the Government, the District Court imposed
a sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment and four years of supervised release.
On August 2, 2007, Parker timely filed a notice of appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  The
appellant bears the burden of proving the unreasonableness of a sentence on appeal.  See
United States v. Hankerson, 496 F.3d 303, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2007).  “The record must
disclose meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of
independent judgment, based on a weighing of the relevant factors, in arriving at a final
sentence.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571-72 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc); see
also United States v. Sevilla, No. 07-1105, 2008 WL 4069453, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Sept. 4,
2008).
4III.
Parker’s sole argument is that his sentence is unreasonable because the District
Court did not conduct and demonstrate a meaningful consideration of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors prior to sentencing.  He asserts that if the District Court had
given the § 3553(a) factors “meaningful” consideration, it would have given him a
sentence below the guidelines range.  The mitigating factors Parker refers to include his
post-offense rehabilitation, his physical condition, his drug dependence and abuse, his
lack of guidance as a youth, his family responsibilities, and his mental and emotional
conditions.
We must decide “whether the [D]istrict [Court] imposed the sentence [it] did for
reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” 
United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).  “[T]here are no magic words that a [D]istrict [Court] must invoke
when sentencing, as long as the record shows that the court considered the § 3553(a)
factors and any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties which have recognized
legal merit and factual support in the record.”  United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501,
505 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court indicated that it had received and read
the parties’ briefs.  The Court asked counsel to restate the arguments in the briefs and
present any other information “because we want to make sure there’s nothing missed.” 
5Immediately prior to announcing Parker’s sentence, the District Court referred to the
§ 3553(a) factors and gave a detailed description of Parker’s background.  The District
Court stated:
Mr. Parker[ is] 34 years old . . . suffers from asthma and is prescribed
Dilantin for seizures.  As a child he experienced emotional difficulties and
was placed in special education classes.  He was suspended from school
when he was approximately ten years old for hitting a teacher . . . .  After
two months of [inpatient psychiatric] treatment, . . . he was seen at the
Manhattan Children’s Psychiatric Center . . . [and] Children’s Village in
Dobbs Ferry, New York, for continued special education classes and
psychotherapy.  Testing . . . indicated that Mr. Parker had an IQ of 84.  He
reportedly finished eleventh grade . . . .  The defendant was raised by his
mother in New York City.  The defendant has never married but has been in
a long term relationship with Vernessa Armstrong.  Their union has
produced two children.  Mr. Parker advised the probation officer that he
began using [drugs] when he was 13 years old . . . .  Mr. Parker’s criminal
history includes a total of eight prior [drug] convictions . . . .  He has a
negligible employment history.  We have carefully considered all of the
factors set forth in 18 United States Code, Section 3553(a) . . . .  We have
also considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities . . .
and the need to impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than
necessary to comply with the conditions set forth in 18 United States Code,
Section 3553(a).  We have also considered the presentencing briefs and the
comments of the defendant and both counsel made today.  After
consideration of all of the above, we conclude that a sentence at the low end
of the advisory guideline range is reasonable under all of the circumstances
of this case.  The reasons for the sentence imposed in this case are to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to protect the
public, to provide just punishment for the offense, and to deter Mr. Parker
and other persons similarly situated from similar conduct in the future.
The record shows that the District Court appropriately considered the § 3553(a)
factors.  Accordingly, we conclude that Parker has not met his burden of showing his
sentence to be unreasonable.
6IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
sentence.
